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ARGUMENT

The State takes issue with the Defendant's appeal on three grounds in its Brief of
Respondent. (hereinafter "BOR"). The first is that the district court judge applied the plain
meaning of the statute and did not rely on legislative intent to interpret the statute in question.
The second is that the statute was clear and unambiguous and therefore not unconstitutionally
vague. Finally, the Defendant's appeal is moot. The Defendant will address each in turn.
A. THE DISTRICT COURT'S OPINION CLEARLY RELIED ON LEGISLATIVE
INTENT IN INTERPRETING THE STATUTE WITHOUT FIRST APPLYING THE
PLAIN AND COMMON MEANING OF THE WORDS AND FURTHERMORE THE
COURT LOOKED TO PHARMACOLOGICAL EFFECT WHERE THAT LANGUAGE
HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THE ST ATUTE.

The State suggests that the district court reached its conclusion by applying the plain and
ordinary meaning of the words and then referenced legislative intent merely to show the
consistency in the position (i.e. the legislative intent was apparent in the language of the statute.).
However, the formatting and language of the opinion demonstrate that not to be true. First and
foremost was the court's reliance on evidence and interpretations surrounding the alleged
psychotropic effects of AM-2201.
Without rehashing the argument made in Appellant's opening brief the legislature
removed language from the statute relating to the pharmacological effects of the substances in
question and thereby rendered the statute entirely structure based. Appellant's Opening

Brief~

10-

12 (Mar. 2013 ). Because the remaining language of the statute looked only to structure any
analysis as to the pharmacological effect goes beyond the plain language of the statute. See I.C. §
3 7-2705( d)(30). Nevertheless, the district court took into consideration alleged pharmacological
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effects of AM-2201 in determining it was a substance the legislature intended to ban. R. at 30608 and 313-1 S. Indeed. the court considered the pharmacological effects to be an a component in
the analysis when it stated. "[t]he psychoactive substance in marijuana is Tetrahyrdocannibinol
or THC 'and/or synthetic substances, derivatives, and their isomers with similar chemical
structure' is referring to synthetic marijuana or synthetic substances that mimic the

hallucinogenic properties of marijuana." R. at 307 (emphasis added). Later in its opinion the
district court discussed further the nature of the pharmacological effects it had identified through
its own research with AM-2201. R. at 314-15.
The discussion surrounding the effects of the chemical were in answering the question
the cowi posed to itself asking "[i]n lay terms, is this substance [AM-2201] a synthetic
cannibinoid?" R. at 313. The district court's analysis went beyond the plain and ordinary words
in the statute by looking to pharmacological effect where the legislature had removed language
expressly relating to pharmacological effect and replaced it with structural language. Therefore
the State incorrectly represents that the district court applied the plain language of the statute and
the court's decision was in error.
There is ample evidence in the court's written opinion that its interpretation was driven by
legislative intent and not the plain language. On page four of the court's opinion it recites
boilerplate language on the statutory construction but does not yield an interpretation of the plain
language of I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30) at that time. R. at 300. The court then recites its understanding
of the arguments relating to the chemistry of the substance in question and the statute. R. at 301304. Again. no interpretation of the statute is forthcoming in those pages. Then, the court states,
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"[als stated by Dr. De Jesus, the Idaho legislature is not a body of chemists. The issue is what did
the legislature intend to add to Schedule I?" R. at 304. Just previous to that statement the court
evidences the fact it has looked to legislative history when it stated in part, "Nor is it apparent
from the legislative history that the lawmakers adopted the sponsor's reasoning along with the
proposed language in the bill....Consequently, this is not part of the legislative history and sheds
little light on the intent of the legislature." R. at 303-04 n.5. Again, that language precedes any
interpretation of the statute by the court.
The court then proceeds to set forth what it believes to be the relevant language of the
statute and notes that "[b ]y stripping the statute down to the component parts to be construed it is
fairly easy to discern the intention of the legislature." R. at 306. From that language one can
reasonable conclude that the court means the legislative intent can be readily discerned from the
plain language of the statute. However, the court's next statement demonstrates that in fact that is
not the case as it then goes straight to its conclusion that "the psychoactive substance in
marijuana is [THC]" and the "synthetic substances" language is "refening to synthetic marijuana
or synthetic substances that mimic the hallucinogenic properties of marijuana." R. at 307. The
court could not have gotten to the "hallucinogenic properties of marijuana" from the plain
language and therefore the legislative intent must have been discerned from sources other than
the statute.
Next the court references the minutes of the legislative committees when it stated, "[t]he
minutes of the legislative committees also make clear that the purpose behind the legislation is
the banning of categories of substances, not just particular compounds." R. at 308. But perhaps
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most convincing is the court's recitation of a Statement of Purpose supplied by the State which
states:
The purpose of the legislation is to create safe regulations for the public concerning
[THC] from synthetic drugs (Spice) that mimic the effects of Cannabis and identifying
additional substances to be classified in Schedule I.
R. at 307.
The language referenced by the Court is not statutory and is part of the legislative history.
Nevertheless, based on the language from the committee minutes and the Statement of Purpose
the court concluded that "imitators of marijuana," or "synthetic substances that mimic the
hallucinogenic properties of marijuana" were covered by the statute. Such a conclusion could not
have been drawn fi:om the plain language of the statute and came only after the court reviewed
and recited aspects of legislative history in making its conclusion.
There can be little doubt that the co mi did not apply the literal and plain language of the
statute but rather afforded the statute an interpretation based on the perceived legislative intent
outside of the statutory language. Of the most significant import was the court's reliance on its
conclusions as to the alleged pharmacological effects of AM-2201 in concluding it was of the
type intended to be criminalized by the legislature. It was error to do so and this Court should
reverse the district court's decision.
B. THE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE BECAUSE IT LENDS
ITSELF TO DIFFERING OPINIONS ON ITS MEANING AND LEAVES A PERSON OF
ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE GUESSING AS TO WHAT CONDUCT IS ILLEGAL.
The language as set forth in the 2011 version of LC.

§ 37-2705(d)(30) is

unconstitutionally vague because it contains misleading language thereby creating confusion as
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to what is criminal and what is not. The confusion begins with the statute's phrase, "synthetic
equivalents of the substances contained the plant [cannabis]. .. and/or synthetic substances,
derivatives. and their isomers with similar chemical structure such as ... " I.C. § 372705(d)(30)(emphasis added). The term "synthetic equivalent" leaves people guessing as to its
meaning. ft was this term the court relied upon when turning to pharmacological effect despite
language in the same paragraph stating "with similar chemical structure" and intentionally
omitting pharmacological activity. See R. at 306-07. Consequently, one can view "synthetic
equivalent" as meaning a substance that has a chemical structure that is similar to THC whereas
the court adopted the opinion that it is something that behaves like THC. The plain language of
the statute fails to put people on notice that the pharmacological effects of the substance will
determine whether it is a synthetic equivalent.
The confusion continues with the legal fiction that the listed substances under the "such
as" language in any way resembles the structure of THC. A side-by-side comparison of the
substances such as JWH-018, JWH-019, JWH-122, and/or AM-2201 to THC show distinct and
substantial differences in the chemical structure. See Ex. lO(a). 1 While AM-2201 may have only
a single atom difference between it and JWH-018 both of those chemicals look nothing like
THC. id. Nevertheless, the statute references THC and criminalizes synthetic equivalents of
THC and "synthetic substances ... with similar chemical structure" to THC. I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30).

1

The exhibits in the record contain a single exhibit that was not assigned an exhibit number but
was placed between exhibit 10 and exhibit 11. The reason for the exhibit number omission is
likely because the unnumbered exhibit was part of the motion to reconsider and not the original
motion to dismiss. For ease of reference the Defendant will refer to that exhibit as 1Oa.
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It is THC not JWH-018. to which AM-2201 is ultimately being compared. In providing
the list of examples of substances that have a "similar chemical structure" with THC the statute
describes whole groups of compounds (which would admittedly include JWH-018) that in reality
bear no resemblance to the chemical structure of THC. The result is a complete legal fiction
wherein the legislature has deemed JWH-018 to be structurally similar to THC despite the
factual reality to the contrary. The result is that anyone reviewing a chemical not expressly
described in the example list is left guessing as what is actually structurally similar to THC since
the example list itself does not resemble THC.
The confusion is compounded by the stunning degree of distinction in the example list
between structures that are different in only the most minute ways. The example list sets forth
compounds and then delineates the various forms of the compound that will still fall within the
statute. I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a). Of the ways delineated, the legislature provided that any
"substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring by alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl,
cycloalkylethyl..." would be included in the language of the statute. Id. The sole difference
between an alkly and alkenyl is the presence of one or more double bonds between one or more
carbon atoms. Tr. at 40:22-42:9. In other words, a single double bond anywhere on the
substituent chain renders an alkenyl rather than an alkyl. Id. The same minute distinction is
drawn out between cycloalkylmethyl and cycloalkylethyl which differ by an atom. Tr. at 43:244:3. A person looking at the list must wonder why the legislature used language so specific and
nuanced if it was not intended to provide some guidance as to which variances would be
considered similar to THC and which ones would not. If describing the "parent compound" was
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all that was necessary for an example list then the legislature only confused the matter by adding
the alkyl language as it is assumed that language serves some function in describing the types of
substances that are illegal. It was this aspect above all others that so troubled the Defendant's
experts who continually came back to that language as the defining features of the statute. It is
this aspect that was resolved in 2012 when the legislature amended the language to remove the
alkyl language and thereby remove some of the confusion.
The above referenced aspects of the statute made the language vague in the present case.
This is because in order for AM-2201 to be covered under the statute it would have to resemble
the example list which in turn. by operation of legal fiction, resembles THC. Such a process
brings to mind a common logic formula A=B, B=C, therefore A=C. The problem arises where B
does not equal C but may look similar to C. At that point the logic problem breaks down and so
does the statute because of the legal fiction, and the fact that A does not factually equal B to
begin with.
When one looks at the AM-2201 in the present case it does not resemble THC. When one
looks at the example language in the statute, AM-2201 does is excluded because it does not
contain an "alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkylmethyl, cycloalkylethyL or 2-(4-morpholinyl)ethyl." Tr. at
39-40. l 18-25. and 131. Rather it contains an alkyl halide, also known as a haloalkyl. Id. While
only a single atom makes this distinction in the world of chemistry a single atom can make a lot
of difference. Besides. if single atoms do make a difference, why then did the legislature take
pains to make distinctions between structures that are only an atom different? If the legislature
demonstrates a single atom difference is worth covering under the statute then a person of
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ordinary intelligence is reasonable in concluding that a single atom rendering an alkyl to an alkyl
halide removes it from the language of the statute.
Indeed, both the Defendant and the State understood the issue rested in the determination
of vvhether an alkyl halide was included in subsection (ii)(a) as the briefing and arguments
focused on that issue. It was the court, not the parties, that turned from that language, and
concluded that looking to that language "misses the point." See R. at 305.
According the district court in the present case, that ordinary person would be wrong
because looking to the language in subsection (ii)(a) "misses the point." R. at 305. Indeed, the
Court ultimately declines to even determine whether AM-2201 is described in subsection (ii)(a)
concluding instead that because AM-2201 behaves like THC it was therefore intended to be
covered by the statute. Such is the very essence of vagueness. Under the district court's
interpretation the language in subsection (ii)(a) serves more as a red herring than an example list
because the question would ultimately be one of pharmacological effect and not structure. See R.
at 306-08. In short, the Defendant should have known that effect would be given to a noncodified Statement of Purpose and no effect would be given to the language in the example list.
It was this application of the legislative intent and disregard for the details of the example list
that rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague.
C. THE DEFENDANT'S APPEAL IS NOT MOOT AS THE MOTION WAS
SPECIFIC AS TO AM-2201, THE SUBSTANCE OF AM-2201 WAS THE PRIMARY
SUBSTANCE IDENTIFIED IN THE DEFENDANT'S OPERATION, AND IF IT WERE
FOUND THAT AM-2201 WAS NOT ILLEGAL THE DEFENDANT WOULD HAVE
MISTAKE OF FACT DEFENSES AT TRIAL.

The State correctly notes that the Defendant was found in possession of three different
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chemicals. AM-220L JWH-019. and JWH-210. R. at 236-37. The samples were derived at
different times and from different sources (i.e. dumpster dives and controlled buys). R. at 13470. The Criminal Complaint filed by the State lumped all of the substances into a single count
without distinguishing between the substances. R. at 10-15 and 32-36.
The Defendant acknowledges that JWH-019 and JWH-210 would fall under the
description of proscribed chemicals in I.C. § 37-2705(d)(30)(ii)(a) but takes issue with the State's
assertion that AM-2201 also falls under that statute. It is as if the State charged someone with
possession of marijuana. cocaine, and sugar in the same count without breaking apart the
substances. The resulting problem for the Defendant was attacking the charges as they related to
AM-2201 where AM-2201 had been rolled up in the same count as JWH-019 and JWH-210. The
Defendant approached it by filing a motion to dismiss as to the AM-2201 only.
Even if the Defendant were successful in his motion, Count I would have not been
dismissed in its entirety because of the remaining substances JWH-019 and JWH-210.
Nevertheless, a dismissal as to allegations relating to AM-2201 would have opened up mistake
of fact defenses to the Defendant. More specifically, if the court concluded AM-2201 was not a
controlled substance the Defendant could have, and would have, claimed he never intended to
possess either JWH-019 or JWH-210, nor did he know he was in possession of those chemicals
as he believed he possessed only AM-2201. Due to the court's conclusion this defense was
unavailable as the Defendant would essentially be saying he intended to have one controlled
substance, not three, but a controlled substance nonetheless.
The procedural quandry was caused by the method of charging and the Defendant had to
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stylize the motion with something. It was understood by the State and the Court what the nature
of the challenge was and its ultimate purpose. The Court stylized it as a motion to suppress in its
decision memorandum. R. at 300. Whatever the proper name for the motion its purpose was clear
to the parties involved and the court and that purpose remains the same. A determination is
needed on the chemical AM-220 l as that determination either opens or closes doors to other
defenses for the Defendant. To that end it is not a moot issue. The Defendant's appeal was
conditioned on that premise with the understanding that if AM-2201 is legal he can withdraw his
guilty plea and pursue the remainder of the charges at trial. For that reason the appeal is still
properly before this Court.

CONCLUSION
The district court improperly turned to legislative intent and history. The court
improperly looked to pharmacological effect and consequently rendered an incorrect
interpretation of the statute. It was error to do so and the court's decision should be overturned.
The statute is unconstitutionally vague as it creates confusing legal fictions and focuses
on minute structural differences that are not considered by the court. The statute eliminated
references to pharmacological activity and yet the alleged pharmacological effect was the driving
factor in concluding AM-220 l was covered by the statute. Because the basis for the conclusion
was based on language not derived from the statute it must be unconstitutionally vague as
applied. For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in the Defendant's Opening Brief the
Defendant respectfully requests that this Couii reverse the decision of the district court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of June, 2013.
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